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Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Abstract QBism may be the most significant contribution to the search for mean-
ing in quantum mechanics since Bohr, even as Bohr’s philosophy remains the most
significant revision of Kant’s theory of science. There are two ironies here. Bohr
failed to realize the full extent of the affinity of his way of thinking with Kant’s,
and QBists fail to realize the full extent of their agreement with Bohr. While
Bohr’s discovery of contextuality updates Kant’s transcendental philosophy in a
way that leaves the central elements of the latter intact, Kant’s insight into the
roles that our cognitive faculties play in constructing physical theories can con-
siderably alleviate the difficulties that Bohr’s writings present to his readers. And
while throwing a QBist searchlight on Bohr’s writings can further alleviate these
difficulties (as well as reveal the presence in them of the salient elements of QBist
thought), Bohr’s writings can in turn provide answers to important questions that
QBism leaves unanswered (and also allay some of QBism’s extravagances). In the
final sections I confront the two most impenetrable mysteries yet unearthed: mak-
ing sense of quantum mechanics, and the dual mystery of making sense of (i) the
existence of consciousness in a seemingly material world and (ii) the existence
in consciousness of a seemingly material world. Here the relevant arguments are
framed in the context of the philosophy of the Upanishads, according to which we
(as Schro¨dinger put it) “are all really only various aspects of the One.” There is
no world that exists out of relation to consciousness, but there are different poises
of consciousness. In particular, there is a poise of consciousness peculiar to the
human species at this point in time, and there are poises of consciousness that are
yet to evolve (and that may be essential to averting the calamities towards which
humanity appears to be heading).
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2 Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics has a well-known problem. It comes in two versions, a BIG
one and a small one.[1] The former is a pseudo-problem if ever there was one.
Pseudo-problems arise from false assumptions, which in this case is the belief
that a quantum state is some kind of evolving physical state. The latter arises
once it is recognized that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics is
a probability calculus, and that the events to which (and on the basis of which)
it assigns probabilities indicate measurement outcomes. It consists in the fact
that the outcome-indicating properties of outcome-indicating devices have to be
treated differently from other physical properties. Nine decades after this problem
was solved by Niels Bohr in or around 1929 (albeit in a way that nobody seems to
have understood), and after half a century of futile attempts at solving it without
taking account of the universal context of science, which is human experience,[2]
there is light at the end of the tunnel. It is called QBism. Launched at the beginning
of the 21st Century by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack,[3] QBism
may be the most significant contribution to the search for meaning in quantum
mechanics since Bohr, even as Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics is still the
most significant revision of Kant’s theory of science.
To David Mermin,[4] QBism is “as big a break with 20th century ways of
thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about
art.” The big break lies not in the emphasis that the mathematical apparatus
of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus—that ought to surprise no one—
but in this plus a radically subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability plus
a radically subjective interpretation of the events to which (and on the basis of
which) probabilities are assigned. What distinguishes the outcome-indicating prop-
erties of outcome-indicating devices from other physical properties is that they
are perceived. They are experiences. Nothing but the incontestable definiteness
and irreversibility of direct sensory experience can account for the definiteness of
outcome-indicating properties and the irreversibility of measurements.
There are two ironies here. The first is that Bohr failed to realize the full extent
of the affinity of his way of thinking with Kant’s. The second is that QBists fail to
realize the full extent of their agreement with Bohr. While Bohr’s discovery of the
contextuality of quantum phenomena updates Kant’s transcendental philosophy
in a way that leaves the central elements of the latter intact, being acquainted with
Kant’s insight into the roles that our cognitive faculties of intuition (Anschauung)
and thought play in constructing physical theories can considerably alleviate the
difficulties that Bohr’s writings present to his readers. And while throwing a QBist
searchlight on Bohr’s writings can further alleviate these difficulties (as well as
reveal the presence in them of the salient elements of QBist thought), Bohr’s
writings can in turn provide answers to important questions that QBism leaves
unanswered (and also allay some of QBism’s disconcerting extravagances).
My first order of business, carried out in Sec. 2, is to set off empirical realism—
the kind of realism that was inaugurated by Immanuel Kant and defended (among
others) by Hilary Putnam and Bernard d’Espagnat1—against the two kinds of
1 Putnam assumed the existence of a mind-independent real world but insisted that it does
not dictate its own descriptions to us: “talk of ordinary empirical objects is not talk of things-in-
themselves but only talk of things-for-us”[5]; “we don’t know what we are talking about when
we talk about ‘things in themselves’ ”[6]. D’Espagnat[7] stressed the necessity of distinguishing
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realism that preceded it: direct or na¨ıve realism and indirect or representational
realism. Section 3 presents an outline of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and
Sec. 4 backs up the claim that Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics agrees in
all essential respects with Kant’s theory of science.
Bohr’s unique understanding of quantum mechanics is the focus of the next four
sections, beginning in Section 5 with a general outline of his views. It is important
to distinguish Bohr’s views from (all variants of) the Copenhagen interpretation.
This interpretation only emerged in the mid-1950’s, in response to David Bohm’s
hidden-variables theory and the Marxist critique of Bohr’s alleged idealism, which
had inspired Bohm.[8] Section 6 highlights a key implication of Bohr’s thought,
namely that the dichotomy between quantum systems and attributes created for
them by measurements is unwarranted: experimental conditions are constitutive
not only of the attributes of quantum systems but also of the systems themselves.
Section 7 aims to clarify the respective roles that ordinary language and classical
concepts play in Bohr’s thought, and Sec. 8 addresses a major stumbling block that
Bohr’s writings present to the reader, i.e., his occasional invocations of “irreversible
amplification effects.”
The next four sections are centered around QBism. Section 9 contrasts the
role that language plays (or is claimed to play) in QBism with the role it plays
in Bohr’s thinking. Section 10 addresses flaws in QBism that quite unnecessarily
distract from its core message. Section 11 brings up QBists’ (widely shared) mis-
appreciation of Bohr’s thinking, and Sec. 12 raises the question of whether QBism
countenances a reality beyond “the common external world we have all negotiated
with each other”.[4] (The jury appears to be still out on this.)
The last four sections present my own attempts to confront the two most im-
penetrable mysteries we have yet unearthed: making sense of quantum mechanics,
and the dual mystery of making sense of (i) the existence of consciousness in a
seemingly material world and (ii) the existence in consciousness of a seemingly
material world. To my mind, these mysteries are so intertwined that neither of
them can be solved in isolation.
In Sec. 13 I revisit a reality criterion that I proposed for distinguishing between
two kinds of observables: those that have values only when they are measured, and
those whose values exist independently of measurements (and thus are capable of
indicating measurement outcomes). While far superior to appeals to the size or
weight of the measurement apparatus in justifying the irreversibility of measure-
ments (as Bohr seems to have done), this criterion cannot establish more than the
empirical reality of an intersubjectively constructed world; it only permits us to
treat the known world as if it existed independently of the subjects constructing
it.
Section 14 offers an explanation for “the miraculous identity of particles of
the same type,” which according to Misner et al.[9] “must be regarded, not as a
triviality, but as a central mystery of physics.” If correct, it not only implies the
numerical identity of particles of the same type but also makes it possible to argue
consistently that, at bottom, any object we observe here with these properties
and any object we observe there with those properties are one and the same
“thing.” It further suggests that quantum physics concerns not the world that is
between an empirically inaccessible veiled reality and an intersubjectively constructed objective
reality.
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manifested (as classical physics does) but how it is manifested. In Sec. 15 the stages
of the (atemporal) process of manifestation are outlined, and the question of why
quantum mechanics is the general theoretical framework of physics is answered.
The final section goes beyond physics. It concerns (i) the manifestation of
qualia—the sensory “stuff” that the shapes of experienced things are made of—and
(ii) the part that the human brain—the only thing that we know both “from the
inside” and “from the outside”—plays in the manifestation of the world. Here the
relevant arguments are framed in the context of the philosophy of the Upanishads,
according to which we (as Schro¨dinger put it) “are all really only various aspects
of the One”.[10] The world is an evolving manifestation of “the One,” and not
only atoms and subatomic particles but also brains and their biological support
structures are instrumental in this manifestation. There is no world that exists
out of relation to consciousness, but there are different poises of consciousness
(or kinds of experience, or modes of awareness). In particular, there is a poise of
consciousness peculiar to the human species at this point in time, and there is a
poise of consciousness that is yet to evolve (and that may be essential to averting
the calamities towards which humanity appears to be heading).
2 Three kinds of realism: direct, representational, and empirical
In an essay written during the last year of his life,[10] Erwin Schro¨dinger expressed
his astonishment at the fact that despite “the absolute hermetic separation of my
sphere of consciousness” from everyone else’s, there is “a far-reaching structural
similarity between certain parts of our experiences, the parts which we call exter-
nal; it can be expressed in the brief statement that we all live in the same world.”
This similarity, Schro¨dinger avowed, “is not rationally comprehensible. In order
to grasp it we are reduced to two irrational, mystical hypotheses,” one of which
is “the so-called hypothesis of the real external world”.2 Schro¨dinger left no room
for uncertainty about what he thought of this hypothesis: to invoke “the existence
of a real world of bodies which are the causes of sense-impressions and produce
roughly the same impression on everybody . . . is not to give an explanation at
all; it is simply to state the matter in different words. In fact, it means laying a
completely useless burden on the understanding.” It means uselessly translating
the statement “everybody agrees about something” into the statement “there ex-
ists a real world which causes everybody’s agreement.” Instead of explaining the
fact expressed by the first statement, the second merely heightens its incompre-
hensibility, for the relation between this postulated real world and those aspects
of our experiences about which there is agreement is something we cannot know.
The causal relations we know are internal to those parts of our experiences about
which we agree.
Before Descartes, to be was either to be a substance or to be a property of
a substance. With Descartes, the human conscious subject assumed the role of a
substance: to be meant either to be a subject or to exist as a representation for a
subject. Thus was born the representative theory of perception, and along with it
said useless burden on the understanding.
2 See Sec. 15 for the second of the two hypotheses.
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Fig. 1 A neuroscientist explaining the explanatory gap. Drawing by Jolyon Troscianko
(jolyon.co.uk). Reproduced with permission.
Most current scientific accounts of perception still labor under this burden.
They begin by assuming that there is a mind-independent external world, in which
objects emit photons or sound-waves, which stimulate peripheral nerve endings
(retinas or ear drums). The stimulated nerves then send signals to the brain,
where neural processes miraculously give rise to perceptual experience (Fig. 1).
Neither do we have the slightest idea about how this “explanatory gap”[11] could
be bridged, nor do we have the slightest idea about how perceptual experience
could enlighten us as to the mind-independent external world. While the aforesaid
scientific accounts begin by invoking events in a mind-independent external world,
they lead to the conclusion that we have access only to perceptual experience, and
that there is no way we could ever have access to that mind-independent world.3
In the eyes of John Searle,[12, p. 23] the move from the na¨ıve view that “we
really perceive real objects” to the view that we only perceive sense-impressions,
was “the greatest single disaster in the history of philosophy over the past four
centuries.” In an attempt to defend na¨ıve or direct realism against indirect or
representational realism, he invoked the fact that we are able to communicate
with other human beings using publicly available meanings in a public language.
For this to work, he argued,[12, p. 276] we have to assume the existence of common,
publicly available objects of reference:
So, for example, when I use the expression “this table” I have to assume
that you understand the expression in the same way that I intend it. I
have to assume we are both referring to the same table, and when you
understand me in my utterance of “this table” you take it as referring to
the same object you refer to in this context in your utterance of “this table.”
The implication then is that
3 This was already obvious to the Greek philosopher-poet Xenophanes, who some twenty-
five centuries ago pointed out that even if our minds represented the world exactly as it was,
we could never know that it did.
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you and I share a perceptual access to one and the same object. And that
is just another way of saying that I have to presuppose that you and I are
both seeing or otherwise perceiving the same public object. But that public
availability of that public world is precisely the direct realism that I am
here attempting to defend.
Searle points out that his argument is transcendental in the sense of Immanuel
Kant. Kant’s greatest achievement is to have demonstrated how a scientific theory
can be provided with much stronger justification than mere empirical adequacy.
The kind of argument inaugurated by him to this end begins by assuming that a
certain proposition p is true, and then shows that another proposition q, stating
a precondition for the truth of p, must also be true. For his purpose, the relevant
proposition p was the assumption that empirical knowledge was possible, and
the corresponding proposition q was the conclusion that certain universal laws of
nature must hold. In the argument presented by Searle, p is the assumption that
we are able to communicate with each other in a public language, and q is the
conclusion that there must be publicly available objects in a public world about
which we can communicate in a public language.
The realism that Searle’s argument succeeds in defending is not the one it
purports to defend. It is the empirical realism that was inaugurated by Kant and
defended by Putnam and d’Espagnat (among others). It is the sort of realism that
is based not on any kind of agreement between a theory and a reality independent
of us but on the agreement (as far as it goes) between our respective “spheres of
consciousness”—between what exists for me, in my experience, and what exists
for you, in your experience.
3 Kant
[T]hose who really want to understand contemporary physics—i.e., not only to
apply physics in practice but also to make it transparent—will find it useful,
even indispensable at a certain stage, to think through Kant’s theory of science.
— Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker[13]
Transcendental philosophy—inaugurated by Kant[14] and continued in the 20th
century by Edmund Husserl[15]—emerged as a critique of the representative the-
ory. Here is how it was defined by Kant: “I call all cognition transcendental that
is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of
objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts would
be called transcendental philosophy.” [CPR 149]4 The concepts in question are
synthetic rather than analytic. The reason they are synthetic is that they enable
us to “work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects”
[CPR 136]. The reason they are not analytic is that they owe nothing to contingent
experience. They owe their meanings to the logical structure of thought and the
spatiotemporal structure of experience.
The logical relation between a subject and a predicate makes it possible to
think of a particular nexus of appearances as the properties of a substance, con-
nected to it as predicates are connected to a subject. It makes it possible for me
4 These references are to The Critique of Pure Reason.[14]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond 7
to think of appearances as connected not in me, the subject, but in an object.
The logical relation between antecedent and consequent (if . . . then. . . ) makes it
possible to think of appearances at different times as the changing properties of
substances connected by causality. It makes it possible for me to think of suc-
cessive appearances as connected not merely subjectively, in my experience, but
also objectively. And the category of community or reciprocity, which Kant asso-
ciated with the disjunctive relation (either. . . or. . . ), makes it possible to think
of appearances in different locations as properties of substances connected by a
reciprocal action. It makes it possible for me to think of simultaneous appearances
as objectively connected. (Kant thought that by establishing a reciprocal relation,
we establish not merely an objective spatial relation but also an objective relation
of simultaneity.)
But if I am to be able to think of my perceptions as a system of external ob-
jects, the connections must be lawful. If appearances are to be perceptions of a
particular kind of object (say, an elephant), they must be connected in an orderly
way, according to a concept denoting a lawful concurrence of appearances. If ap-
pearances are to be perceptions of causally connected events, like (say) lightning
and thunder, they must fall under a causal law, according to which one appear-
ance necessitates the subsequent occurrence of another. (By establishing a causal
relation falling under a causal law, we also establish an objective temporal rela-
tion.) And if appearances are to be reciprocally connected objects, like (say) the
Earth and the Moon, they must affect each other according to a reciprocal law,
such as Newton’s law of gravity. It is through lawful connections in the “mani-
fold of appearances” that we are able to think of appearances as perceptions of a
self-existent system of objects.
Kant’s inquiry into the preconditions of empirical science was an inquiry into
the preconditions of the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects—
things that the subjects of these impressions could treat as if they existed inde-
pendently of subjects and their impressions. The crucial premise of this inquiry
was that “space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only
conditions of the existence of the things as appearances.” [CPR 115] They are not
conditions of the existence of things in themselves, things that exist independently
of subjects and their impressions. Combined with the fact that all physical con-
cepts have visualizable content, and thus owe their meanings to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience,5 this implies
that we have no concepts of the understanding and hence no elements for
the cognition of things except insofar as an intuition can be given corre-
sponding to these concepts, consequently that we can have cognition of no
object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible
intuition, i.e. as an appearance; from which follows the limitation of all
even possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of experience.
[CPR 115, original emphasis]
By placing the subject matter of empirical science squarely into the context of hu-
man experience, Kant dispelled many qualms that had been shared by thinkers at
5 Position and orientation are in an obvious sense visualizable. Linear and angular momen-
tum derive their meanings from the symmetry properties of space or the invariant behavior of
closed systems under translations and rotations, while energy derives its meaning from the uni-
formity of time or the invariant behavior of closed systems under time translations. Causality
and interaction, too, are in obvious ways related to space and time.
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the end of the 18th century—qualms about the objective nature of geometry, about
the purely mathematical nature of Newton’s theory, about the unintelligibility of
action at a distance, and about Galileo’s principle of relativity.
Concerning the laws of geometry, which apply to objects constructed by us in
the space of our imagination, the question was why they should also apply to the
physical world. Kant’s answer was that they apply to objects perceived as well as to
objects imagined because visual perception and visual imagination share the same
space.6 As to the mathematical nature of Newtonian mechanics, it was justified,
not by the Neo-Platonic belief that the book of nature was written in mathemati-
cal language, but by its being a precondition of scientific knowledge. What makes
it possible to conceive of appearances as aspects of an objective world is the math-
ematical regularities that obtain between them. Newton’s refusal to explain action
at a distance was similarly justified, inasmuch as the only intelligible causality
available to us consists in lawful mathematical relations between phenomena: for
the Moon to be causally related to the Earth was for the Moon to stand in a
regular mathematical relation to the Earth. As to the principle of relativity, ditto:
lawful mathematical relations only exist between phenomena, and thus only be-
tween objects or objective events, but never between a particular phenomenon and
space or time itself.7
For this remarkable achievement there was a price to be paid. To preserve the
objectivity of science, it must be possible to think of phenomena as appearances
of things in themselves:
even if we cannot cognize these same objects as [i.e., know them to be]
things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in
themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that
there is an appearance without anything that appears. [CPR 115, original
emphasis]
In other words, we must be able to decontextualize nature, to free it from the
context of human experience, to forget that it is the product of a synthesis achieved
by the experiencing subject. The price to be paid was that we must ignore the
transcendent reality which affects us in such a way that we have the impressions
that we do, and that we are able to organize our impressions into objects that
change and interact with each other in accordance with laws of nature.
4 Kant and the quantum theory
By the time quantum mechanics came along, scientists and philosophers alike had
realized that renouncing ontological prejudices and sticking to operationally defin-
able notions was the safest way to arrive at reliable knowledge. At the same time
classical physics, still deemed eminently successful, appeared to support a realistic
6 It is noteworthy that Kant’s argument applies, not to Euclidean geometry specifically, even
though it was the only geometry known in Kant’s time, but to geometry in general, and thus
to whichever geometry is best suited to formulating the laws of physics. It has even been said
that Kant’s theory of science set in motion a series of re-conceptualizations of the relationship
between geometry and physics that eventuated in Einstein’s theories of relativity.[16]
7 Here, too, it would be an anachronism to argue that Kant singled out Galilean relativity,
even though it was the only relativity known in his time. His argument holds for every possible
principle of relativity, including Einstein’s.
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interpretation. What made it possible to reconcile these opposing tendencies was
Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It offered an ingenious way to go on talking in
realist language about, e.g., electromagnetic waves propagating in vacuum, while
disavowing ontological inclinations. Kant’s transcendental philosophy was there-
fore widely considered to be tightly linked with classical physics, and to make the
latter philosophically acceptable. When classical physics failed to account for such
data as atomic spectra, the obvious conclusion was that Kant’s philosophy fared
no better than na¨ıve realism.[17]
And indeed, many of Kant’s claims appeared to be contradicted by quantum
mechanics. There was the principle of thoroughgoing determination, “according
to which, among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared
with their opposites, one must apply to it.” [CPR 553] In direct contradiction to
this principle, the properties of atomic systems came to be regarded as possessing
values only if (and when) two conditions were satisfied: a set of possible values was
defined by an experimental arrangement, and an actual value was indicated by it.
Then there was the necessary and universal truth of a priori propositions such as
“the law of the connection of cause and effect” [CPR 304], established by Kant as
preconditions of the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects. Yet in
the newly discovered quantum domain, there were no sense-impressions waiting to
be organized into objects. Neither was it possible to conceive of an atom as a nexus
of sense-impressions, nor did atoms satisfy Kant’s a priori laws. In particular, as
was stressed by Schro¨dinger,
Atoms—our modern atoms, the ultimate particles—must no longer be re-
garded as identifiable individuals. This is a stronger deviation from the
original idea of an atom than anybody had ever contemplated. We must be
prepared for anything. [18, p. 162]
Niels Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing not only for the necessary validity but also the
unlimited range of classical concepts, could not but regard his own complementar-
ity interpretation of the quantum formalism as an alternative to Kant’s theory of
science. And yet—just as Kant did not argue for the universal validity of Euclidean
geometry in particular (see Note 6), nor for Galilean relativity in particular (see
Note 7), so his arguments did not establish that the range of classical concepts was
unlimited. As Kant’s arguments had merely established the validity of whichever
geometry (and whichever principle of relativity) was the most convenient, so they
merely established the necessary validity of classical concepts as long as one was
dealing with the organization of sense-impressions into objects (which he assumed
was always the case). Bohr realized that in the new field of experience opened up
by the quantum theory one was not only dealing with the organization of sense-
impressions into objects, and that, consequently, the range of classical concepts was
limited—that it did not extend to quantum systems but only to quantum phenom-
ena. Apart from that, Bohr established the indispensability of classical concepts
in dealing with quantum phenomena by the very same arguments by which Kant
had established it for classical phenomena (i.e., for sense-impressions that allow
themselves to be organized into objects). Here is Bernard d’Espagnat[17] on the
relation between Kant and contemporary physics:
It is true that contemporary physics forces us to give up . . . significant,
although non central, elements of Kant’s thinking. But it more than com-
pensates this blow by practically compelling us to adopt the idea that was,
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in fact, at the very core of Kantism and constitutes its truly original con-
tribution to philosophical thinking, to wit, the view that things and events,
far from being elements of a “reality per se,” are just phenomena, that is,
elements of our experience.
Kant did not anticipate the possibility of an empirical knowledge that, while being
obtained by means of sense-impressions organized into objects, was not a knowl-
edge of sense-impressions organized into objects. Bohr realized that quantum me-
chanics was that kind of knowledge. He completely agreed with Kant that what
is inaccessible to our senses cannot be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience, and therefore cannot be expected to accord with
concepts that owe their meanings to these conditions.
5 Niels Bohr
It is often said that a work of genius resists categorization. If so, Bohr’s philo-
sophical viewpoint easily passes this criterion of greatness. Surely this is one
of the reasons for the commonplace complaints over Bohr’s “obscurity.”
— Henry J. Folse[19]
As a philosopher Niels Bohr was either one of the great visionary figures of
all time, or merely the only person courageous enough to confront head on,
whether or not successfully, the most imponderable mystery we have yet un-
earthed. — N. David Mermin[20]
“Without sensibility no object would be given to us,” Kant wrote [CPR 193], “and
without understanding none would be thought.” Bohr could not have agreed more,
insisting as he did that meaningful physical concepts have not only mathematical
but also visualizable content. Such concepts are associated with pictures, like the
picture of a particle following a trajectory or the picture of a wave propagating in
space. In the classical theory, a single picture could accommodate all of the proper-
ties a system can have. When quantum theory came along, that all-encompassing
picture fell apart. Unless certain experimental conditions obtained, it was impos-
sible to picture the electron as following a trajectory (which was nevertheless a
routine presupposition in setting up Stern–Gerlach experiments and in interpreting
cloud-chamber photographs), and there was no way in which to apply the concept
of position. And unless certain other, incompatible, experimental conditions ob-
tained, it was impossible to picture the electron as a traveling wave (which was
nevertheless a routine presupposition in interpreting the scattering of electrons by
crystals), and there was no way in which to apply the concept of momentum.
If the visualizable content of physical concepts cannot be described in terms
of compatible pictures, it has to be described in terms of something that can be
so described, and what can be so described are quantum phenomena. The definite
definition of a quantum phenomenon is contained in the following passage:
[A]ll unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism in-
volves the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the
atomic system concerned and the character of the possible predictions as
regards subsequent observable properties of that system. Any measurement
in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial
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state or to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination of
measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.
[BCW7: 312]8
Today, Bohr is mostly known for his insistence on the necessity of using classi-
cal concepts, for attributing this necessity to the need to communicate to oth-
ers “what we have done and what we have learned” [BCW7: 273, 331, 349, 390,
418], and for the thesis that “the specification of [the whole experimental arrange-
ment] is imperative for any well-defined application of the quantum-mechanical
formalism”.[22] The conceptual links between these demands, however, belong to
a fabric of thought that is not widely known. In a 1922 letter to his philosophical
mentor Harald Høffding, Bohr wrote:
my personal opinion is that these difficulties are of such a kind that they
hardly allow us to hope, within the world of atoms, to implement a de-
scription in space and time of the kind corresponding to our usual sensory
images. [BCW10: 513]
In each of the following quotes, all from 1929, Bohr refers to space and time as
our “forms of perception”:
[T]he very recognition of the limited divisibility of physical processes . . . has
justified the old doubt as to the range of our ordinary forms of perception
when applied to atomic phenomena. [BCW6: 209]
[W]e can hardly escape the conviction that in the facts which are revealed to
us by the quantum theory and lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms
of perception we have acquired a means of elucidating general philosophical
problems. [BCW6: 217]
This limitation [of our forms of perception] is brought to light by a closer
analysis of the applicability of the basic physical concepts in describing
atomic phenomena. [BCW6: 242]
[W]e must remember, above all, that, as a matter of course, all new expe-
rience makes its appearance within the frame of our customary points of
view and forms of perception. [BCW6: 279]
[W]e must not forget that, in spite of their limitation, we can by no means
dispense with those forms of perception which colour our whole language
and in terms of which all experience must ultimately be expressed.
[BCW6: 283]
[T]he difficulties concerning our forms of perception, which arise in the
atomic theory. . . , may be considered as an instructive reminder of the gen-
eral conditions underlying the creation of mans concepts. [BCW6: 293]
[A]ll our ordinary verbal expressions bear the stamp of our customary forms
of perception, from the point of view of which the existence of the quantum
of action is an irrationality. Indeed, in consequence of this state of affairs,
even words like “to be” and “to know” lose their unambiguous meaning.
[BCW6: 297]
8 These references are to the volumes of the Collected Works of Niels Bohr.[21]
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Today the task of making sense of the quantum theory is widely seen as one of
grafting a metaphysical narrative onto a mathematical formalism, and to do this
with scant consideration to general philosophical issues relating to the meaning
of truth, of objectivity, of reality, or the role of language. For Bohr, as also for
Heisenberg and Pauli, the real issues lay deeper. They judged that the conceptual
difficulties posed by the quantum theory called in question a general framework of
thought that had evolved in Germany beginning with Kant. If (i) space and time
are but our forms of perception, if (ii) physical concepts derive their meanings from
different aspects of these forms (e.g., localizability and homogeneity or invariance
under translations), and if (iii) the facts revealed to us by the quantum theory lie
outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception (in other words, if they
are inaccessible to sensory perception), then these facts cannot be expected to
be expressible by the physical concepts at our disposal. How, then, can they be
expressed, and how can this be done without compromising objectivity? Bohr’s
answer in a nutshell:
the decisive point is that the physical content of quantum mechanics is
exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations
obtained under conditions specified in plain language. [BCW10: 159]
By developing the mathematical part of the quantum theory into an autonomous
formal language, von Neumann[23] transformed the theory into a mathematical
formalism in search of a physical interpretation. Transmogrifying a probability
algorithm—the so-called state vector—into an evolving physical state, adopt-
ing the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, and modeling measurements as two-stage pro-
cesses (“pre-measurement” followed by “objectification”), he gave rise to what
van Fraassen appropriately called “the disaster of objectification”.[24] This is how
quantum mechanics became “the great scandal of physics”,[25] “the silliest” of all
the theories proposed in the 20th century,[26] and a theory that “makes absolutely
no sense”.[27] A distinction is made between the “bare quantum formalism,” which
is regarded as “an elegant piece of mathematics . . . prior to any notion of prob-
ability, measurement etc.,” and the “quantum algorithm,” which is looked upon
as “an ill-defined and unattractive mess”[25].9 “Measurement” has become the
unmentionable M-word of physics.[32] And Bohr, of all people, often gets blamed
for this sorry state of affairs!10
If measurements and plain language played pivotal roles in Bohr’s writings, it
was to ensure the objectivity of the new theory. When he realized that his refer-
ences to “sensory images” and “forms of perception” rather contributed to under-
mining his efforts in that direction, Bohr replaced these expressions by “quantum
9 In reality there is no such thing as a bare quantum formalism. Every single axiom of any
axiomatization of the theory only makes sense as a feature of a probability calculus.[28,29] The
distinction between a bare quantum formalism and a quantum algorithm is as illegitimate as
the distinction between the “easy” problems of consciousness and the “hard” one.[30,31] Both
distinctions are rooted in the obsolescent mode of thinking that is known as “physicalism.”
10 Even by QBists: “The Founders of quantum mechanics were already aware that there
was a problem. Bohr and Heisenberg dealt with it by emphasizing the inseparability of the
phenomena from the instruments we devised to investigate them. . . . Being objective and in-
dependent of the agent using them, instruments miss the central point of QBism, giving rise
to the notorious measurement problem, which has vexed physicists to this day”.[33, emphasis
added] In actual fact, it was von Neumann who gave rise to this problem. For Bohr there
was “no new observational problem” [BCW10: 212] because we are doing what we have always
done: setting up experiments and reporting their results.
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phenomena” and “experimental arrangements.” I owe this observation to the ed-
itor of the two volumes of Bohr’s Collected Works that deal specifically with the
foundations of quantum physics:
when the phrase “forms of perception” was replaced by “experimental ar-
rangement”, “the objectivity of physical observations” could be stressed
without the somewhat bewildering addition that it could be “particularly
suited to emphasize the subjective character of all experience”.[34]
While the business of physics was “the development of methods for ordering and
surveying human experience,” this was to be done “in a manner independent of
individual subjective judgement and therefore objective in that sense, that it can
be unambiguously communicated in the common human language” [BCW10: 157–
158]:
To clarify this point [whether we are concerned with a complete description
of natural phenomena], it was indeed necessary to examine what kind of
answers we can receive by so to say putting questions to nature in the form
of experiments. In order that such answers may contribute to objective
knowledge, independent of subjective judgement, it is an obvious demand
that the experimental arrangement as well as the recording of observations
be expressed in the common language, developed for our orientation in the
surroundings. [BCW10: 212]
At one time Heisenberg[35] drew a dividing line between “the apparatus which
we. . . , in a way, treat as part of ourselves,” and “the physical systems we wish to
investigate.” Pauli likewise thought that it was “allowed to consider the instru-
ments of observation as a kind of prolongation of the sense organs of the observer”
[BCW10: 564]. Bohr would have none of this. The observed had to be detached
from the observer (rather than the other way round), and there was only one way
to do this: to take the means of observation, rather than the system observed,
for what was actually observed, what was directly accessible to our senses, and
what therefore was amenable to communication using words and concepts we can
understand. The dividing line was to be drawn, not between the apparatus as part
of ourselves and the object of investigation, but between our observing selves and
the observed apparatus. What could not be separated from the object of inves-
tigation was not the subject, which remained the same detached observer it had
been before quantum physics came along, but the means of investigation. And this
was not a matter of choice, for without the apparatus not only did the object of
investigation lack properties but, in fact, there was no object of investigation.
6 Quantum systems or quantum phenomena?
Where there are no sense-impressions waiting to be organized into objects, there
are no objects. Bohr’s emphatic rejection of the familiar language of objects when
dealing with these facts cannot be overemphasized:
The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are confronted
in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as regards all questions
of terminology. Speaking, as is often done, of disturbing a phenomenon by
observation, or even of creating physical attributes to objects by measuring
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processes, is, in fact, liable to be confusing, since all such sentences imply a
departure from basic conventions of language which, even though it some-
times may be practical for the sake of brevity, can never be unambiguous. It
is certainly far more in accordance with the structure and interpretation of
the quantum mechanical symbolism, as well as with elementary epistemo-
logical principles, to reserve the word “phenomenon” for the comprehension
of the effects observed under given experimental conditions. [BCW7: 316]
If there is no object to be disturbed by a measurement, if even the dichotomy of
objects and attributes created for them by measuring processes is unwarranted,
then it is not just the measured property but the quantum system itself that is
constituted by the experimental conditions under which it is observed.
More recently this point was forcefully made by Brigitte Falkenburg in her
commendable monograph Particle Metaphysics:
[O]nly the experimental context (and our ways of conceiving of it in classical
terms) makes it possible to talk in a sloppy way of quantum objects. . . . Bare
quantum “objects” are just bundles of properties which underlie superselec-
tion rules and which exhibit non-local, acausal correlations. . . . They seem
to be Lockean empirical substances, that is, collections of empirical prop-
erties which constantly go together. However, they are only individuated
by the experimental apparatus in which they are measured or the con-
crete quantum phenomenon to which they belong. . . . They can only be
individuated as context-dependent quantum phenomena. Without a given
experimental context, the reference of quantum concepts goes astray. In
this point, Bohr is absolutely right up to the present day. [36, pp. 205–206,
original emphases]
A similar conclusion was reached by Ole Ulfbeck and Aage Bohr,[37] for whom
“there is no longer a particle passing through the apparatus and producing the
click. Instead, the connection between source and counter is inherently non-local.”
While “clicks can be classified as electron clicks, neutron clicks, etc., . . . there are no
electrons and neutrons on the spacetime scene.” Hence “there is no wave function
for an electron or a neutron but a wave function for electron clicks and neutron
clicks, etc.”
7 Objectivity, ordinary language, and classical concepts
Presently (July 2019) a combined Google search for “Bohr” and “classical lan-
guage” (the latter term including the quotes) yields more than 5,000 results. A
search for “Bohr” and “language of classical physics” yields nearly 25,000 results.
By contrast, searching the 13 volumes of the Complete Works of Niels Bohr does
not yield a single occurrence of either “classical language” or “language of clas-
sical physics.” While Bohr insisted on the use of classical concepts for describing
quantum phenomena,11 the language on the use of which he insisted was “ordinary
language” [BCW7: 355], “plain language” [BCW10: 159], the “common human lan-
guage” [BCW10: 157–158], the “language common to all” [10:xxxvii]. A distinction
11 Sometimes Bohr refers instead to “elementary physical concepts”: “all subjectivity is
avoided by proper attention to the circumstances required for the well-defined use of ele-
mentary physical concepts” [BCW7: 394].
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must therefore be drawn between the role that classical concepts played in Bohr’s
thinking and the role that was played by the common human language.12
To represent the content of my experience as objective, I do not need to rep-
resent it as a system of objects located in space and changing with time in such a
way that they can be re-identified and compared, as Kant had taught, but I need
to be able to refer to such objects, and for this I need to use ordinary language.
Ordinary human language uses words we can all understand, inasmuch as their
meanings are rooted in what is common to us, i.e., the spatiotemporal structure of
human experience and the logic of human thought or the structure of human lan-
guage. This also applies to the concepts of classical physics, but the uses we make
of ordinary language and of classical concepts in quantum physics are distinct.
To be able to extend the use of a classical physical concept beyond the domain
of re-identifiable objects with intrinsic attributes, we need an experimental con-
text, and to unambiguously describe the experimental context we need ordinary
language: “all well-defined experimental evidence, even if it cannot be analysed in
terms of classical physics, must be expressed in ordinary language.” [BCW7: 355]
Objectivity thus requires both classical concepts and ordinary language. It requires
“plain language suitably refined by the usual physical terminology” [BCW7: 390] or
“conveniently supplemented with terminology of classical physics” [BCW10: 277]:
By objectivity we understand a description by means of a language com-
mon to all (quite apart from the differences in languages between nations)
in which people may communicate with each other in the relevant field.
[BCW10: xxxvii]
From a logical standpoint, we can by an objective description only under-
stand a communication of experience to others by means of a language
which does not admit ambiguity as regards the perception of such commu-
nications. In classical physics, this goal was secured by the circumstance
that, apart from unessential conventions of terminology, the description is
based on pictures and ideas embodied in common language, adapted to our
orientation in daily-life events. [BCW10: 276]
Faced with the question of how under such circumstances we can achieve
an objective description, it is decisive to realize that however far the phe-
nomena transcend the range of ordinary experience, the description of the
experimental arrangement and the recording of observations must be based
on common language. [BCW10: 158]
One day during tea at his institute, Bohr was sitting next to Edward Teller and
Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker. Von Weizsa¨cker[39] recalls that when Teller sug-
gested that “after a longer period of getting accustomed to quantum theory we
12 Jan Faye[38] has argued that “Bohr was not a transcendentalist in his insistence on the
use of classical concepts. Instead he had a naturalistic attitude to how common language
came about.” Certain passages from the Bohr canon can be adduced in support of this claim,
e.g., when Bohr insists on the use of the “common language developed for our orientation
in the surroundings” [BCW10: 212], or when he points out that in classical physics the goal
of an objective description is secured by the circumstance that such descriptions are “based
on pictures and ideas embodied in common language, adapted to our orientation in daily-life
events” [BCW10: 276]. I do not think, however, that transcendentalist and naturalistic attitudes
are mutually exclusive, nor that Bohr’s motivation for insisting on the use of classical concepts
was primarily naturalistic.
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might be able after all to replace the classical concepts by quantum theoretical
ones,” Bohr listened, apparently absent-mindedly, and said at last: “Oh, I under-
stand. We also might as well say that we are not sitting here and drinking tea but
that all this is merely a dream.” If we are dreaming, we are unable to tell others
what we have done and what we have learned. Therefore
it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic
theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical
physics by new conceptual forms. . . . the recognition of the limitation of
our forms of perception by no means implies that we can dispense with our
customary ideas or their direct verbal expressions when reducing our sense
impressions to order. [BCW6: 294]
Or, as Heisenberg put it,[40, p. 56] “[t]here is no use in discussing what could
be done if we were other beings than we are.”13 Bohr’s claim that the “classical
language” (i.e., plain language supplemented with terminology of classical physics)
was indispensable, has also been vindicated by subsequent developments in particle
physics:
This [claim] has remained valid up to the present day. At the individual
level of clicks in particle detectors and particle tracks on photographs, all
measurement results have to be expressed in classical terms. Indeed, the use
of the familiar physical quantities of length, time, mass, and momentum-
energy at a subatomic scale is due to an extrapolation of the language of
classical physics to the non-classical domain.[36, p. 162]
8 Irreversible amplification?
If the terminology of quantum phenomena is used consistently, then nothing—at
any rate, nothing we know how to think about—happens between “the fixation of
the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned”
and “the subsequent observable properties of that system” [BCW7: 312]. Any story
purporting to detail a course of events in the interval between a system preparation
and a subsequent observation is inconsistent with “the essential wholeness of a
quantum phenomenon,” which “finds its logical expression in the circumstance
that any attempt at its subdivision would demand a change in the experimental
arrangement incompatible with its appearance.” [BCW10: 278] What, then, are
we to make of the following passages [emphases added]?
[E]very well-defined atomic phenomenon is closed in itself, since its observa-
tion implies a permanent mark on a photographic plate left by the impact of
an electron or similar recordings obtained by suitable amplification devices
of essentially irreversible functioning. [BCW10: 89]
Information concerning atomic objects consists solely in the marks they
make on these measuring instruments, as, for instance, a spot produced by
the impact of an electron on a photographic plate placed in the experimen-
tal arrangement. The circumstance that such marks are due to irreversible
13 Heisenberg thought it possible that the forms of perception of other beings, and hence
their concepts, could be different from ours: they “may belong to the species ‘man,’ but not
to the world as independent of men”.[40, p. 91]
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amplification effects endows the phenomena with a peculiarly closed char-
acter pointing directly to the irreversibility in principle of the very notion
of observation. [BCW10: 120]
In this connection, it is also essential to remember that all unambigu-
ous information concerning atomic objects is derived from the permanent
marks—such as a spot on a photographic plate, caused by the impact of an
electron—left on the bodies which define the experimental conditions. Far
from involving any special intricacy, the irreversible amplification effects on
which the recording of the presence of atomic objects rests rather remind us
of the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation.
[BCW7: 390; BCW10: 128]
If a well-defined atomic phenomenon is closed, how can there be something between
the fixation of the external conditions and a permanent mark on a photographic
plate? Does not the interposition of the impact of an electron and of a subsequent
amplification effect amount to a subdivision of the phenomenon in question?
Ulfbeck and (Aage) Bohr[37] have shed light on this issue. Like Kant and
subsequently (Niels) Bohr, they view space and time as “a scene established for
the ordering of experiences.” Clicks in counters are “events in spacetime, belonging
to the world of experience.” All physical phenomena are described in terms of
variables that have values at all times, and each variable of this kind belongs to
an object that is present on the spacetime scene. The matrix variables of quantum
mechanics are “of an entirely novel type.” A click is an event “by which a matrix
variable manifests itself on the spacetime scene, without entering this scene.” The
key to resolving the issue at hand is that this event—the click—has an “onset”:
[A] click is distinguished by the remarkable property of having an “onset,”
a beginning from which the click evolves as a signal in the counter. The
onset, thus, has no precursor in spacetime and, hence, does not belong to a
chain of causal events. In other words, the onset of the click is not the effect
of something, and it has no meaning to ask how the onset occurred. . . . The
notion that a particle entered the counter, therefore, becomes inappropri-
ate, and it is likewise inappropriate to state that the particle produced the
click. . . . [T]he occurrence of genuinely fortuitous clicks, coming by them-
selves, is recognized as the basic material that quantum mechanics deals
with. . . . The theory of what takes place in spacetime is, therefore, inher-
ently non-local. . . . Thus, the wave function enters the theory not as an
independent element, but in the role of encoding the probability distribu-
tions for the clicks, which is the content of the theory.
In the conventional/orthodox picture, a particle impinges on the counter and pro-
duces a chain of processes leading to the click. For Ulfbeck and Bohr,
there is no incident particle, and the steps in the development of the click,
envisaged in the usual picture, are not events that have taken place on
the spacetime scene. . . . [T]he downward path from macroscopic events in
spacetime, which in standard quantum mechanics continues into the regime
of the particles, does not extend beyond the onsets of the clicks.
The steps in the development of the click—in other words, the irreversible am-
plification effects—only occur in the usual picture. They are not events that have
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taken place on the spacetime scene—in other words, they have nothing to do either
with what we have done or what we have learned. They neither form part of a
quantum phenomenon nor subdivide one.
Because “the quantum-mechanical formalism . . . represents a purely symbolic
scheme permitting only predictions . . . as to results obtainable under conditions
specified by means of classical concepts” [BCW7: 350–351]—in other words, be-
cause “the physical content of quantum mechanics is exhausted by its power to for-
mulate statistical laws governing observations obtained under conditions specified
in plain language” [BCW10: 159]—a quantum phenomenon has a mathematical or
statistical part and a part that relates the same to experience. The irreversible
amplification effects belong to the former. The unmediated step from the so-called
source to the onset of the click, and the subsequent unmediated steps in the de-
velopment of the click, are steps in a gazillion of alternative sequences of possible
outcomes of unperformed measurements, and unperformed measurements have no
effect on the essential wholeness of a quantum phenomenon.
In the following passages Bohr appears to argue that the quantum features
involved in the atomic constitution of the measurement apparatus (or the statis-
tical element in its description) can be neglected because the relevant parts of the
apparatus are sufficiently large and heavy. I am convinced that he did this for the
same reason that he stopped referring to our forms of perception and adopted the
language of quantum phenomena instead.
In actual experimentation this demand [that the experimental arrangement
as well as the recording of observations be expressed in the common lan-
guage] is met by the specification of the experimental conditions by means
of bodies like diaphragms and photographic plates so large and heavy that
the statistical element in their description can be neglected. The observa-
tions consist in the recording of permanent marks on these instruments,
and the fact that the amplification devices used in the production of such
marks involves essentially irreversible processes presents no new observa-
tional problem, but merely stresses the element of irreversibility inherent
in the definition of the very concept of observation. [BCW10: 212, emphasis
added]
In actual physical experimentation this requirement [that we must employ
common language to communicate what we have done and what we have
learned by putting questions to nature in the form of experiments] is fulfilled
by using as measuring instruments rigid bodies like diaphragms, lenses,
and photographic plates sufficiently large and heavy to allow an account
of their shape and relative positions and displacements without regard to
any quantum features inherently involved in their atomic constitution. . . .
The circumstance that [recordings of observations like the spot produced
on a photographic plate by the impact of an electron] involve essentially
irreversible processes presents no special difficulty for the interpretation of
the experiments, but rather stresses the irreversibility which is implied in
principle in the very concept of observation. [BCW10: 165, emphasis added]
Nothing can be large enough or heavy enough to justify
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— the irreversibility in principle of the very notion of observation
[BCW10: 120],
— the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation
[BCW7: 390; BCW10: 128],
— the irreversibility which is implied in principle in the very concept of observa-
tion [BCW10: 165],
— the element of irreversibility inherent in the definition of the very concept of
observation [BCW10: 212].
To believe that Bohr actually thought that the irreversibility of observations—
let alone an essential irreversibility in principle—could be justified by the size
or weight of measuring devices, would be a gross insult to his astuteness. The
only irreversibility that can justify the irreversibility of observations is the incon-
testable irreversibility of human sensory experience. For Bohr, “the emphasis on
the subjective character of the idea of observation [was] essential” [BCW10: 496].
If the description of atomic phenomena nevertheless has “a perfectly objective
character,” it is “in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual
observer and that therefore . . . no ambiguity is involved in the communication of
information” [BCW7: 390, emphasis added]. It was never in the sense that no ex-
plicit reference was made to the community of communicating observers or to the
incontestable irreversibility of their experiences. It is only if one wants to disavow
any reference to experience that one may have to substitute something like a suf-
ficiently large or heavy apparatus for that irreversibility. Bohr may have intended
in this way to appease the na¨ıve realistic inclinations of lesser minds, but it certain
does not characterize his own philosophical stance.
9 QBism, language, and the external world
It is beyond doubt that significant progress was made during the roughly four
decades between the passing of Niels Bohr and the advent of QBism. We now
have a congeries of complex, sophisticated, and astonishingly accurate probability
algorithms—the standard model14—and we are witnessing rapid growth in the
exciting fields of quantum information and quantum technology. By contrast, the
contemporaneous progress in quantum theory’s philosophical foundations mainly
consists in finding out what does not work, e.g., the various attempts to trans-
mogrify statistical correlations between observations into physical processes that
take place between or giving rise to observations.
Whereas a quantum state exists in a Hilbert space, we live in a 3D space,
at least in the sense that it frames our experience of an external world. Hilbert
space “knows” nothing about a world of objects localized in a 3D space. We do.
To make the abstract Hilbert space relevant to our experience, we represent it as
a space of wave functions defined on a configuration space and evolving in time.
This configuration space and this time are not part of the aforesaid “elegant piece
of mathematics” (the so-called bare quantum formalism); they belong to the “ill-
defined and unattractive mess” (the so-called quantum algorithm) to which that
“elegant piece of mathematics” owes its physical meaning and relevance.
14 “Standard model is a grotesquely modest name for one of humankind’s greatest
achievements”.[41]
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As a system of formal propositions, quantum mechanics allows us to call a self-
adjoint operator “elephant” and a spectral decomposition “trunk.” This makes
it possible to prove a theorem according to which every elephant has a trunk.
Either the words “time” and “space” mean as little as the word “elephant” does
when it is used in this way, or they owe their meanings to human experience,
in which case wave functions encapsulate correlations between experiences. Self-
adjoint operators on a Hilbert space do not become observables by calling them
“observables,” any more than they become elephants by calling them “elephants.”
They come to be associated with observables when they are seen as tools for
assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements, which do not
happen in a Hilbert space. The real business of interpreting the quantum formalism
is to situate it in the experiential framework in which “time” and “space” make
sense, not to use these words in ways that divest them of their meanings.
The great merit of QBism is to put the spotlight back on the role that human
experience plays in creating a physical theory. If measurements are irreversible and
outcomes definite, it is because our experiences are irreversible and definite. This
at once disposes of the disaster of objectification. Bohr could have said the same,
and arguably did, but in so many words that the core of his message has been lost
or distorted beyond recognition. The fundamental difference between Bohr and
QBism is that one was writing before interpreting quantum mechanics became a
growth industry, while the other emerged in reaction to the ever-growing number
of futile attempts at averting the disaster of objectification in the same realist
framework in which it arose.
To make the centrality of human experience duly and truly stick, QBism em-
phasizes the individual subject. It is not we who experience the world. At first the
experience is not ours; it is yours and mine. It becomes ours, and the process by
which it becomes ours is communication:
What is real for an agent rests entirely on what that agent experiences, and
different agents have different experiences. An agent-dependent reality is
constrained by the fact that different agents can communicate their experi-
ence to each other, limited only by the extent that personal experience can
be expressed in ordinary language. Bob’s verbal representation of his own
experience can enter Alice’s, and vice-versa. In this way a common body of
reality can be constructed. . . . [33]
This was also Schro¨dinger’s take.[10] Here is how he set up the question:
I get to know the external world through my sense-perceptions. It is only
through them that such knowledge flows into me; they are the very material
out of which I construct it. The same applies to everyone else. The worlds
thus produced are, if we allow for differences in perspective, etc., very much
the same, so that in general we use the singular: world. But because each
person’s sense-world is strictly private and not directly accessible to anyone
else, this agreement is strange; what is especially strange is how it is estab-
lished. . . . This is a valid question: how do we come to know of this general
agreement between two private worlds, when they admittedly are private
and always remain so? Direct comparison does not help, for there is none.
It is absolutely necessary that we should start by being deeply troubled
by the monstrous character of this state of affairs, if we are to treat with
indulgence the inadequate attempts that have been made to explain it.
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So what establishes the correspondence “between the content of any one sphere of
consciousness and any other, so far as the external world is concerned?”
What does establish it is language, including everything in the way of ex-
pression, gesture, taking hold of another person, pointing with one’s finger
and so forth, though none of this breaks through that inexorable, absolute
division between spheres of consciousness.
Thus it seems that, as far as the external world is concerned, Bohr, Schro¨dinger,
and the QBists are all on the same page. They all agree that experience pro-
vides the material from which we construct “a common body of reality,” and that
language is the means by which we construct it.
But here I must respond to something I strongly disagree with. Mermin[4]
claims that “[o]rdinary language comes into the QBist story in a more crucial
way than it comes into the story told by Bohr.” He supports this by saying that
“measurement outcomes in QBism are necessarily classical, in a way that has
nothing to do with language,” thereby suggesting that Bohr would disagree. I am
certain that he would not. For QBism as for Bohr, measurement outcomes are
definite and irreversible because experiences are definite and irreversible.
Mermin points out that “language is the only means by which different users
of quantum mechanics can attempt to compare their own private experiences,”
and that it is only by verbally sharing our experiences “that we can arrive at a
shared understanding of what is common to all our own experiences of our own
external worlds.” This of course is true for everyone, not just for users of quantum
mechanics. Science is, as Mermin puts it, “a collaborative human effort to find . . .
a model for what is common to all of our privately constructed external worlds.”
Notwithstanding that Bohr considered unambiguous communicability to be the
very criterion for objectivity, I am certain that he would not agree with the idea
that each of us first constructs a private external world, and that language comes
in only after this is done, as a means of figuring out what is common to all our
privately constructed external worlds. The simple fact of the matter is that one
cannot construct a private external world before being in possession of a language
providing the concepts that are needed for its construction.
Arguably nobody has shed more light than Kant on how each of us constructs
her or his private external world, assuming that we are in possession of the relevant
concepts. In Kant’s view, I construct a system of interacting, re-identifiable objects
by combining relations that owe their meanings to our “forms of perception” with
relations that owe their meanings to the logical structure of our thought or the
grammatical structure of “a language common to all.” Here I made use of phrases
from the Bohr canon in order to highlight Bohr’s affinity with Kant, and I wrote
our “forms of perception” and our thought because we could never communicate
with each other and arrive at a common external world if my forms of perception
and the logical structure of my thought were different from yours. The essential
similarity of the general form of my perceptions and my thoughts with yours is a
presupposition that is implicit in every statement about the external world.
It might seem at first that Kant had little to say about how we make the
move from privately constructed external worlds to a shared external world. But
if my forms of perception are the same as yours, and if the logical structure of
my thought is identical to yours, then we use the same concepts in constructing
our private external worlds. And then it makes little difference whether we talk
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to ourselves silently (i.e., construct our private external worlds) or talk to each
other loudly (i.e., construct our common external world). Mermin overlooks that
language plays the same constitutive role in his private construction of his own
private external world as it does in the “collaborative human effort to find . . . a
model for what is common to all of our privately constructed external worlds.”
10 Locating the boundary of our common external world
John Bell is famous for, among other things, his disapproval of the word “mea-
surement” in quantum mechanics textbooks and the “shifty split of the world into
‘system’ and ‘apparatus’ ” thereby entailed:
There can be no question—without changing the axioms—of getting rid of
the shifty split. Sometimes some authors of ‘quantum measurement’ theo-
ries seem to be trying to do just that. It is like a snake trying to swallow
itself by the tail. It can be done—up to a point. But it becomes embarrass-
ing for the spectators even before it becomes uncomfortable for the snake.
[32]
While for Heisenberg the location of the split (a.k.a. the Heisenberg cut) was to
some extent arbitrary, for Bohr it was unambiguously determined by the mea-
surement setup.15 In an attempt to get rid of the shiftiness of the split, QBists
put the measurement outcome into the mind of an agent and replace the mea-
surement setup by any old action taken by the agent: a measurement is an action
taken to elicit one of a set of possible experiences, and the outcome of a mea-
surement is the experience elicited by such an action.16 Accordingly there are as
many splits between the agent-experiencer and the system acted on as there are
agent-experiencers, and there is nothing shifty about the slits:
Each split is between an object (the world) and a subject (an agent’s ir-
reducible awareness of her or his own experience). Setting aside dreams or
hallucinations, I, as agent, have no trouble making such a distinction, and
I assume that you don’t either. Vagueness and ambiguity only arise if one
fails to acknowledge that the splits reside not in the objective world, but
at the boundaries between that world and the experiences of the various
agents who use quantum mechanics. [43]
Let us disregard the philosophically questionable concept of awareness of one’s own
experience (of what one experiences or is aware of). The trouble with this approach
is that it poses a dilemma. If QBism treats “all physical systems in the same
way, including atoms, beam splitters, Stern-Gerlach magnets, preparation devices,
measurement apparatuses, all the way to living beings and other agents”,[44] and
if the action taken “can be anything from running across the street at L’E´toile
in Paris (and gambling upon one’s life) to a sophisticated quantum information
experiment (and gambling on the violation of a Bell inequality)”,[45] then Bohr’s
15 If the diaphragm is fixed, it is part of the experimental arrangement; if it is moveable, it is
part of the system under investigation.[22] See Camilleri and Schlosshauer[42] for a discussion
of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s divergent views on this matter.
16 While Fuchs and Schack prefer the term “agent,” Mermin prefers the term “user,” to
emphasize that QBists regard quantum mechanics as a “user’s manual”.[4]
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crucial insight that the properties of quantum systems are contextual—that they
are defined by experimental arrangements—is lost.
To preserve this contextuality, Fuchs re-introduces the apparatus (which does
not feature in the act of running across the street at L’E´toile) as a part of the
agent:
QBism holds with Pauli (and against Bohr) that a measurement apparatus
must be understood as an extension of the agent himself, not something
foreign and separate. A quantum measurement device is like a prosthetic
hand, and the outcome of a measurement is an unpredictable, undetermined
“experience” shared between the agent and the external system. [45]
Whereas orthodoxy has it that the experimenter acts on laboratory equipment
(i.e., manipulates it with her actual hands), according to Fuchs she acts on the
“external system” using her prosthetic hand. This brings us to the other horn of
the dilemma, for now it is not clear where the apparatus—the prosthetic hand—
ends and the rest of the laboratory begins. It appears that one shifty split has been
traded for another. What is worse, Bohr’s crucial insight that the apparatus defines
the physical quantity it serves to measure, is lost. A measurement apparatus is
needed not only to indicate the possession of a property (by a system) or a value
(by an observable) but also, and in the first place, to make a set of properties or
values available for attribution to a system or an observable. The sensitive regions
of an array of detectors define the regions of space in which the system can be
found. In the absence of an array of detectors, the regions of space in which the
system can be found do not exist. The orientation of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus
defines the axis with respect to which a spin component is measured. In the absence
of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, the axis with respect to which a spin component
can be up or down does not exist. What physical quantity is defined by running
across the street at L’E´toile in Paris?
We cannot describe an object without describing it. For describing an object we
need concepts, and if we want to describe a quantum object, we need to make the
concepts that are available to us applicable to it. And for this we need experimental
arrangements. There is a clear-cut demarcation between the (quantum) object of
investigation and the means of investigation, notwithstanding that we have no
way of separating the object from the means of investigation: the means we can
describe directly, the object only indirectly, in terms of correlations between what
we may do and what we may learn as a result. No such clear-cut demarcation
exists between what forms part of the experimenter’s prosthetic hand and what
does not. Fuchs’ response to this objection is that the physical extent of the agent
is up to the agent:
The question is not where does the quantum world play out and the classical
world kick in? But where does the agent expect his own autonomy to play
out and the external world, with its autonomy and its capacity to surprise,
kick in? The physical extent of the agent is a judgment he makes of himself.
[46]
While Mermin places the quantum/classical divide between each individual users
subjective experience and “the common external world we have all negotiated with
each other”,[4] Fuchs places it between the agent-cum-instrument and the rest of
the physical world. In other words, the dividing line—wherever the agent chooses
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to place it—is drawn in the objective world, which is precisely what Mermin
objects to when he writes that “[v]agueness and ambiguity only arise if one fails to
acknowledge that the splits reside not in the objective world, but at the boundaries
between that world and the experiences of the various agents who use quantum
mechanics”.[43]
The single most important message of QBism is that the definiteness and irre-
versibility of measurement outcomes is rooted in the incontestable definiteness and
irreversibility of each human individual’s sensory experience. QBists believe that
this requires them to treat all physical systems in the same way, from subatomic
particles to measurement apparatuses and on to all agents except the experienc-
ing one. As a consequence, they must consider the outlandish possibility of “some
amazing quantum interference experiment” that puts Wigner’s friend in a coherent
superposition of having experienced two different measurement outcomes.
In Wigner’s scenario,[47] Wigner’s friend (F ) performs a measurement on a
system S using an apparatus A. Treating F as a quantum system, and treating
quantum states as ontic states evolving unitarily between measurement-induced
state reductions, Wigner concludes that a reduction of the combined system S+A
occurs for F when she becomes aware of the outcome, while a reduction of the
combined system S+A+F occurs for him when he is informed of the outcome by F .
This scenario led Wigner to conclude that the theory of measurement was logically
consistent only “so long as I maintain my privileged position as ultimate observer.”
QBism, on the contrary, maintains that Wigner’s state assignment, which is based
on his actual past and possible future experiences, is as valid as his friend’s, based
as that is on a different set of actual past and possible future experiences. But
this important point can be made without alienating a well-inclined audience by
envisioning Wigner’s friend in a coherent superposition of two distinct cognitive
states:
Wigner’s quantum-state assignment and unitary evolution for the com-
pound system are only about his own expectations for his own experiences
should he take one or another action upon the system or any part of it.
One such action might be his sounding the verbal question, “Hey friend,
what did you see?,” which will lead to one of two possible experiences for
him. Another such action could be to put the whole conceptual box into
some amazing quantum interference experiment, which would lead to one
of two completely different experiences for him. [45]
Everything we believe—including what we claim to know—is a belief. QBists are
absolutely right about this. The objective world is what we collectively believe to
exist. If my beliefs about the objective world are based on my experiences, and if
your beliefs about the objective world are based on yours, then I may be ignorant
of your experiences, but I cannot doubt the definiteness of your experiences. Built
into our shared beliefs about the objective world—the common external world
we have all negotiated with each other—is the definiteness not only of Wigner’s
experiences but also of his friend’s. Hence it would be folly for Wigner to assign a
coherent superposition to the system consisting of his friend, her apparatus, and
the quantum object on which she performs her experiment. He is not only perfectly
justified but required to assign to this system an incoherent mixture reflecting his
ignorance of his friend’s actual experience. To treat his own experiences as definite
but not those of his friend—that would be the solipsism which Wigner feared and
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sought to avoid by proposing “that the equations of motion of quantum mechanics
cease to be linear, in fact that they are grossly non-linear if conscious beings enter
the picture.”
QBists are united in rejecting “the silly charges of solipsism.” But in order to
avoid these charges, a QBist must do more than acknowledge the fact that “[m]y
experience of you leads me to hypothesize that you are a being very much like
myself, with your own private experience”.[4] She must take into account the in-
contestable definiteness not merely of her own experiences but also of those of all
other experiencing subjects, and therefore she must not fantasize about coherent
superpositions that involve an experiencing subject’s distinct possible experiences.
In other words, she must draw the dividing line between the definite world of expe-
rience and the quantum domain proper not at the near boundary of our common
external world (between it and each individual users subjective experience), nor
within our common external world, but at its far boundary (between it and the
quantum domain proper, which can only be described in terms of correlations
between preparations and observations). It is our common external world in its
entirety that is imbued with the classicality of direct sensory experience.
11 Objectivation, not reification
As it is an irony that Bohr drew the battle lines in a way which put Kant and
himself on opposing sides, so it is an irony that QBists draw their battle lines in
a way which puts Bohr and themselves on opposing sides. Thus Fuchs et al.:
The Founders of quantum mechanics were already aware that there was
a problem. Bohr and Heisenberg dealt with it by emphasizing the insepa-
rability of the phenomena from the instruments we devised to investigate
them. Instruments are the Copenhagen surrogate for experience. . . . [They
are] objective and independent of the agent using them. [33]
And thus Mermin:
Those who reject QBism . . . reify the common external world we have
all negotiated with each other, purging from the story any reference to the
origins of our common world in the private experiences we try to share with
each other through language. . . . by “experience” I believe [Bohr] meant
the objective readings of large classical instruments. . . . Because outcomes
of Copenhagen measurements are “classical,” they are ipso facto real and
objective. [4]
While QBists are generally aware of the important distinction between what Mer-
min calls “reification” and what Schro¨dinger[10] called “objectivation,” they share
the prevalent misappreciation of Bohr’s thinking (just as I once did). Bohr was
concerned with objectivation, the process of representing a shared mental con-
struct as an objective world, not with reification, which implies ignorance that
the objective world is the result of such a process. Objectivation means purging
from the story any reference to the origins of the “common body of reality” con-
structed by us,[33] so that science may deal with this construct in the same way
as common-sense realism does—as if it existed independently of our thoughts and
perceptions. Reification is the willful denial of objectivation, the self-contradictory
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assertion that the world we perceive exists independently of our perceptions, that
the world we mentally construct exists independently of our constructing minds,
or that the world we describe exists independently of our descriptions.
To Bohr, instruments straddle the far boundary of our common external world.
Measurement outcomes are “classical” not because they are reified but because
they are situated in this intersubjectively constituted world. Instruments are ob-
jective not because they are independent of the agent using them but because they
belong to that world. Instead of being a “surrogate of experience,” instruments
make it possible to extend the reach of classical concepts—concepts whose mean-
ings are tied to the pre-existent structures of our thoughts and perceptions—into
the non-classical domain via principles of correspondence.17
The statement that those who reject QBism reify the common external world
we have all negotiated with each other, also rings false. One can certainly reject
some of the (sometimes mutually inconsistent) claims made by QBists without
reifying the objectivized world. What is true is the converse: those who reify the
objectivized world will have to reject QBism.
12 Is there a “world in itself”?
Kant—the first to make empirical reality the subject of physical science—found
it necessary to posit an empirically inaccessible thing or world in itself. This has
the power to affect us in such a way that we have the sensations that we do, and
that we are able to organize our sensations into objects that interact with each
other and change in accordance with physical laws. (It also contains ourselves as
transcendental subjects, our free will, and our moral responsibility, but this isn’t
relevant here.)
Bohr realized that empirical knowledge need not be limited to what is acces-
sible to our senses, and that therefore it does not have to be solely a knowledge
of interacting, re-identifiable objects and causally connected events. In that he
went beyond Kant. But he also realized, with Kant, that what was not directly
accessible to our senses could not be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience, and thus could not be expected to be describable
in any language we can understand (apart from the language game of pure math-
ematics18). He did not deny the existence of an empirically inaccessible reality; he
only denied that physics has anything to do with it.19
17 “[Q]uantum mechanics and quantum field theory only refer to individual systems due to
the ways in which the quantum models of matter and subatomic interactions are linked by
semi-classical models to the classical models of subatomic structure and scattering processes.
All these links are based on tacit use of a generalized correspondence principle in Bohr’s
sense (plus other unifying principles of physics).” This generalized correspondence principle
serves as “a semantic principle of continuity which guarantees that the predicates for physical
properties such as ‘position’, ‘momentum’, ‘mass’, ‘energy’, etc., can also be defined in the
domain of quantum mechanics, and that one may interpret them operationally in accordance
with classical measurement methods. It provides a great many inter-theoretical relations, by
means of which the formal concepts and models of quantum mechanics can be filled with
physical meaning”.[36, pp. XII, 191]
18 “To say mathematics is a game is supposed to mean: in proving, we need never appeal to
the meaning of the signs, that is to their extra-mathematical application”.[48]
19 “We meet here in a new light the old truth that in our description of nature the purpose
is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is
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Schro¨dinger has often been depicted as a realist about wave functions. While
this was true of the Schro¨dinger of 1926, it does not apply to the Schro¨dinger post
1926, who according to Michel Bitbol[49] adopted a postmodernist stance. This is
from a 1950 lecture:
we do give a complete description, continuous in space and time with-
out leaving any gaps, conforming to the classical ideal—a description of
something. But we do not claim that this ‘something’ is the observed or ob-
servable facts; and still less do we claim that we thus describe what nature
. . . really is. In fact we use this picture (the so-called wave picture) in full
knowledge that it is neither. [18, p. 144, original emphasis]
Where nature itself was concerned, Schro¨dinger thus agreed with Bohr, who would
say (as reported by his assistant Aage Petersen[50]) that it is “wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say
about nature.” What we can say about nature constitutes the empirical reality
that for Kant was nature.
When it comes to QBism, the situation is less clear. In an early QBist mani-
festo, Fuchs asked: “If the quantum state represents subjective information, then
how much of its mathematical support structure might be of that same character?
Some of it, maybe most of it, but surely not all of it.” The “raw distillate” that
is left behind “when we are finished picking off all the terms (or combinations
of terms) that can be interpreted as subjective information . . . will be our first
glimpse of what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about nature itself ”.[51,
emphasis added] Two years later, when talk of “information” had been replaced
by personalist Bayesian phraseology, Fuchs and Schack[52] made reference to “the
world as it is without agents”:
The agent, through the process of quantum measurement stimulates the
world external to himself. The world, in return, stimulates a response in
the agent that is quantified by a change in his beliefs—i.e., by a change from
a prior to a posterior quantum state. Somewhere in the structure of those
belief changes lies quantum theory’s most direct statement about what we
believe of the world as it is without agents.
More recently Fuchs wrote: “If the agent were to go poof, the quantum state
would go poof too. Quantum states are not part of the scaffolding of the world;
only quantum systems are.” In other words, there is a quantum world—a world
that contains quantum systems. This is also implied by the claim (in the same
paper[45, emphasis added]) that “the only piece of the quantum formalism that
plays an objective role is the normative character of the Born Rule”.20
The above statements are ambiguous with regard to the nature of “nature
itself.” Is it all that is not present in the subject’s private external world, or is
it what lies beyond our common external world? Is what the agent touches with
possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience.” [BCW6: 296] This has an
entirely Kantian ring to it.
20 To QBists, quantum mechanics is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of probability.
They underscore this claim by demonstrating that “[t]he Born Rule is nothing but a kind
of Quantum Law of Total Probability! No complex amplitudes, no operators—only probabil-
ities in, and probabilities out”.[53] While the Born rule is normative—it guides an agent’s
behavior—it is also an empirical rule. It is a statement about the quantum world, indirectly
expressed as a calculus of consistency for bets placed on the outcomes of measurements.
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his prosthetic hand part of our common external world, or does the agent-cum-
apparatus reach beyond the far boundary of our common external world?
Mermin sides with Bohr in rejecting the Paulian notion, embraced by Fuchs,
that the apparatus is part of the agent, and writes[54] that “QBists (at least this
one) attach no meaning to ‘the world as it is without agents.’ It only means ‘the
common external world we have all negotiated with each other’.” But Mermin also
writes that (according to QBism) “my understanding of the world rests entirely
on the experiences that the world has induced in me throughout the course of
my life”,[4] and again that “[t]he world acts on me, inducing the private experi-
ences out of which I build my understanding of my own world”.[55] The world
that induces private experiences in me—is it our common external world, or is
it something like the Kantian thing in itself, which induces the experiences from
which we construct our common external world? It seems to me that it has to be
the latter, for what induces experiences in us can hardly be the world we construct
from our experiences.
13 A reality criterion revisited
Before I encountered QBism, I wrote a series of papers[28,56,57,58,59,60,61] in
which I insisted on at least two of the basic tenets of QBism: that quantum mechan-
ics is a probability calculus, and that quantum observables have values only when
they are measured. Probability 1 is not sufficient for “is” or “has.” The only reality
criterion is being the outcome of a measurement. I did, however, lack the QBist
insight that the definiteness and irreversibility of measurements was attributable
solely to the definiteness and irreversibility of direct perceptual experience. For
the purpose of distinguishing between (i) observables that have values only when
they are measured and (ii) observables whose values are real per se (and thus
capable of indicating measurement outcomes), I proposed a criterion I still regard
as entirely appropriate, although I now see it more clearly as a means to secure
the objective reality of an intersubjectively constructed world. While superior to
appeals to the size or weight of an apparatus in justifying the irreversibility of a
measurement, it only permits us to treat that world as if it existed independently
of the constructing subjects.
There are two kinds of indefiniteness or indeterminacy to be addressed. The
first comes into play when the measurement problem is formulated in the context
of evolving quantum states, which gives rise to the disaster of objectification.
Unitary evolution leads to superpositions of macroscopically distinct states, like
a “0” and a “1” on a digital display or a pointer deflecting both to the left and
to the right (not to mention that poor cat). This problem dissolves as soon as
it is recognized that quantum mechanics is a calculus of correlations between
objectivizable experiences. The second kind of indefiniteness/indeterminacy is real
and at least partly responsible for the stability of matter, however “matter” (the
concept) may be framed.21
21 What is partly responsible for the stability of matter is the existence of stable atomic states,
which are known to us in terms of correlations between preparations and observations. The
simplest example would be the ground state of atomic hydrogen, which defines probability
distributions (conditioned on the lowest outcome of an energy measurement) over (i) the
possible outcomes of a measurement of the atom’s internal relative position and (ii) the possible
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When we use the dispersion of a probability distribution to quantify the in-
determinacy of the position of a quantum object,22 the positions over which the
probabilities are distributed are defined by the sensitive regions of real or imagined
detectors. But how are the positions of the detectors defined? If we are dealing
with an internal relative position (say, the position of the electron relative to the
proton in the ground state of atomic hydrogen), the positions of the (in this case
imagined) detectors are defined relative to another object (the nucleus), which
itself remains undefined. But what defines the positions of the detectors if we
are dealing with an unbound or freely moving object? Fuchs[51] once asked an
important question, which has already been quoted: “If the quantum state repre-
sents subjective information, then how much of its mathematical support structure
might be of that same character?” In particular: are the positions on which wave
functions depend of the same character?
Ψ -ontologists are necessarily xyzt-ontologists as well, postulating as they must
an independently existing spatiotemporal manifoldM. This goes as badly as their
formulation of the measurement problem, which leads to the disaster of objecti-
fication. To wit: Gerhard Hegerfeldt[63,64] and David Malament[65] have shown
that a free particle, localized at a time t1 in a bounded region R1, has a non-zero
probability to be found at a time t2 > t1 in a bounded region R2, even if in the
time between t1 and t2 no light signal can travel from R1 to R2. Since this is in-
consistent with the theory of relativity, it seems to follow that particles cannot be
localized. Having shown that this result also obtains for unsharply localized parti-
cles, Hans Halvorson and Rob Clifton[66] concluded that particle talk is “strictly
fictional”:
The argument for localizable particles appears to be very simple: Our expe-
rience shows us that objects (particles) occupy finite regions of space. But
the reply to this argument is just as simple: These experiences are illusory!
Although no object is strictly localized in a bounded region of space, an
object can be well-enough localized to give the appearance to us (finite
observers) that it is strictly localized.
In actual fact, all that Hegerfeldt, Malament, and Halvorson and Clifton have
shown is that particles are not localizable relative toM. But this manifold is not
where position measurements are made. Actually measured positions are defined
by the sensitive regions of actually existing detectors, and what these authors have
shown for particles also holds for the latter. Neither particles nor detectors can be
outcomes of a measurement of the corresponding relative momentum. The stability of this
particular state (and of other atomic and molecular states, and ultimately of matter in general)
hinges on the indefiniteness of both observables, which finds expression in the irreducible
dispersion of the corresponding distributions over a configuration space.
22 Fuchs[62]: “there might be uncertainty because the world itself does not yet know what
it will give. . . . QBism finds its happiest spot in an unflinching combination of ‘subjective
‘probability’ with ‘objective indeterminism’.” What is essential to the stability of matter—
see the previous note—is not an objective indeterminism but an objective indeterminacy.
Objective indeterminism—a lack of predictability that is not due to anyone’s ignorance of
relevant facts—is an observable consequence of objective indeterminacy. This does not imply
the existence of objective probabilities, as I once argued,[56] but it also casts doubt on the
appropriateness of a probability concept that is based on betting behavior. It may well be
that none of the existing definitions of probability—subjectivist Bayesian, frequentist, and
dispositionist—are adequate for dealing with quantum-mechanical probabilities.
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localized in any finite spatial region of M. Hence what is strictly fictional is the
postulated existence of this manifold.
In order to arrive at a criterion for distinguishing between micro-observables
(defined as having values only when they are measured) and macro-observables
(defined as real per se), I used the following argument.[59,60,61,67]
Physical space is not something that is intrinsically partitioned. To define and
partition a region of space, we need an array of detectors. But no physically re-
alizable array of detector can partition space ad infinitum, i.e., into infinitesimal
regions. In other words, a complete differentiation of physical space such as is taken
for granted by field theories cannot be objectivized. The next best thing to a sharp
trajectory therefore is a trajectory that is so sharp that the bundle of sharp trajec-
tories over which it is statistically distributed is never probed. In other words, the
next best thing to an object with a sharp position is a macroscopic object, defined
as one whose position probability distribution is and remains so narrow that there
are no detectors with narrower position probability distributions—detectors that
could probe the region over which the object’s position statistically extends.
Macroscopic objects thus follow trajectories that are only counterfactually in-
definite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an imaginary spa-
tiotemporal background that is more differentiated than the actual physical world.
The events by which the positions of macroscopic objects are indicated are there-
fore correlated in ways that are consistent with the laws of motion that quantum
mechanics yields in the classical limit. This is what makes it possible to attribute
to the positions of macroscopic objects a measurement-independent reality, to
regard them as defining the space of positions on which the wave functions of
unbound or freely moving objects depend, and to use them as apparatus pointers
in the firm and unassailable conviction that they are definite at all times. (The
unpredictability of a pointer position is a manifestation of the indefiniteness of the
observable whose value it serves to indicate, rather than a manifestation of its own
indefiniteness.)
14 The mystery of identity
No acceptable explanation for the miraculous identity of particles of the same
type has ever been put forward. That identity must be regarded, not as a
triviality, but as a central mystery of physics.
— Charles W. Misner, Kip S. Thorne, and John A. Wheeler[9]
QBists hope to distill the essential characteristics of the quantum world from the
Born rule, which (as they have shown) can be formulated entirely in terms of
probabilities, without involving complex amplitudes. My approach to extracting
essential information about the quantum world from correlations between mea-
surement outcomes differs from theirs in that it relies on Feynman’s formulation
of the theory,[68] which is based on summations over alternatives, which are de-
fined as sequences of outcomes of either performed or unperformed measurements.
Suppose, for example, that we23 perform a series of position measurements,
and that each measurement yields exactly one outcome, i.e., each time exactly one
23 The plural is justified by the fact that measurements take place in our common external
world.
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detector clicks. This would be evidence of a conservation law, and this conservation
law could be construed as evidence of a persistent quantum object—not an object
that causes clicks (Ulfbeck and Bohr are absolutely right about this) but an object
whose successive positions are indicated by the clicks. We would then be able to
construe the clicks as position measurements and to think of the clicking devices
as detectors.
If each time exactly n detectors click, we have evidence that the number of
simultaneous detector clicks is a conserved quantity, but this cannot be construed
as evidence of a fixed number of re-identifiable quantum objects unless further
conservation laws are in force. This is where Feynman’s two rules of summation
become important. If the alternatives are indistinguishable, we assign probabilities
by adding their amplitudes and calculating the absolute square of the result. If the
alternatives are distinguishable, we assign probabilities by calculating the absolute
square of each amplitude and adding the results. In the second case the distinc-
tions we make between the alternatives can be objectivized,24 for example because
the simultaneous clicks are of different types, individuating different Lockean sub-
stances (such as electrons and protons), and because there is a conservation law for
each of these Lockean substances.25 In this case the behavior of the detectors can
be construed as indicating the successive positions of n re-identifiable quantum
objects.
In the first case, nothing in our common external world indicates which quan-
tum object is which. In other words, the distinctions we make between the alter-
natives cannot be objectivized. We are then in the presence of a single quantum
object, which is instantiated but not individuated by the clicks. If we nevertheless
think of the clicks as indicating the positions of quantum objects, we must think of
the objects instantiated by the clicks as identical, and this not in the weak sense of
exact similarity but in the strong sense of numerical identity. They are the same
object in n different places. What is signaled by the detectors that click is the
presence of one and the same object in each of their respective sensitive regions.
But why should we treat a positions differently from other properties, such as
the properties that make electrons distinct from protons? Is there any compelling
reason to believe that the numerical identity of quantum objects in different places
ceases when it ceases to have observable consequences owing to the presence of
“identity tags”? I can think of no such reason. I am therefore prepared to defend
the following claim: a quantum object observed here with these properties and a
quantum object observed there with those properties are one and the same thing.
It appears to us here with these properties and there with those properties.
Kant did not stop at saying that if I see a desk, there is a thing in itself that
has the power to appear as a desk, and if I see a chair in front of the desk, there is
another thing in itself that has the power to appear as a chair. For him, there was
only one thing in itself, which affects us in such a way that we see both a desk and
24 I use the verb “to objectivize” in conjunction with “objectivation,” leaving the more com-
monly used verb “to objectify” to go with “objectification,” which is a stage of the measurement
process thought up by Ψ -ontologists.
25 A single click does not usually announce the type to which it belongs. In general this has
to be inferred from a sequence of clicks. A sequence of clicks makes it possible to measure such
quantities as the radius of curvature of a particle’s track in a magnetic field, a particle’s time of
flight, a particle’s kinetic energy, or a particle’s energy loss through ionization and excitation.
Measuring three of these four quantities is sufficient in principle to positively identify the
particle type, which then makes it possible to classify the individual clicks.[69]
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a chair in front of the desk. What would be news to him is that all is not desks
and chairs. In addition to phenomena in the traditional sense there are quantum
phenomena. In addition to the universal context of human experience, and within
the same, there are experimental contexts instantiating Lockean substances. If
we insist on thinking of these instantiations as things, then quantum mechanics
(at the very least) strongly suggests that the thing we observe here with these
properties and the thing we observe there with those properties is what Kant
would have called the thing in itself. It appears to us here as an electron and there
as a proton.
What we have learned from Kant is this: if we (or our minds) are able to “work
up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects” [CPR 136],
then the system of objects he called “nature” must obey certain laws. What Kant
could not tell us is how the thing in itself affects us in such a way that we are able
to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects. This
is where quantum mechanics comes in. The knowledge it provides does not concern
laws that a world of objects obeys. It concerns how something corresponding to
Kant’s thing in itself causes us to experience a world of objects. It touches on the
age-old subject of how a One becomes Many, but it does not concern the coming
into being of a world that exists independently of experiencing subjects, agents,
or users. It concerns the coming into being of an experienced world.
15 Why quantum mechanics?
It seems clear that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about atoms and
electrons, quarks and strings, not those particular macroscopic regularities as-
sociated with what we call measurements of the properties of these things.
But if these entities are not somehow identified with the wave function itself—
and if talk of them is not merely shorthand for elaborate statements about
measurements—then where are they to be found in the quantum description?
— Sheldon Goldstein[70]
According to Schro¨dinger, the “extensive agreement or parallelism” between our
hermetically separated “spheres of consciousness” can only be explained by either
of two “irrational, mystical hypotheses.” In Sec. 2 we saw what he thought of one
of them. The other, which he endorsed, was that “we are all really only various
aspects of the One”[10]: the multiplicity of minds “is only apparent, in truth there
is only one mind. This is the doctrine of the Upanishads. And not only of the
Upanishads”.[71] The One to whom Schro¨dinger here refers is the ultimate subject,
from which we are separated by a veil of self-oblivion. The same veil (according
to the Upanishads) also prevents us from perceiving the ultimate object, as well
as its identity with the ultimate subject.26
26 Schro¨dinger[72] adds that if “to Western thought this doctrine has little appeal,” it is
because our science “is based on objectivation, whereby it has cut itself off from an adequate
understanding of the Subject of Cognizance, of the mind,” and that “this is precisely the
point where our present way of thinking does need to be amended, perhaps by a bit of blood-
transfusion from Eastern thought. That will not be easy, we must beware of blunders—blood-
transfusion always needs great precaution to prevent clotting. We do not wish to lose the
logical precision that our scientific thought has reached, and that is unparalleled anywhere at
any epoch.”
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If at bottom we are all the same subject (without being aware of it, except by
a genuinely mystical experience that is hard to come by), we can conceive of two
poises of consciousness or two kinds of experience, one in which the One manifests
a world to itself perspectivally, as if experienced by a multitude of subjects from
a multitude of locations within that world, and one in which the One manifests
the same world aperspectivally, as if experienced from no particular location or
from everywhere at once.27 And if we distinguish between two such poises of
consciousness or modes of awareness, we can gain further insight into the origin of
the agreement between our private external worlds. Schro¨dinger’s assertion that
the agreement “between the content of any one sphere of consciousness and any
other” was established by language (and corresponding declarations by QBists)
leave unexplained the agreement between my sense impressions and yours, without
which it would be impossible for my description of my impressions to agree with
your description of your impressions. The reason why my sense impressions agree
with yours (to the extent that they do) is that we do experience the same world,
albeit from different vantage points.28
Once we are clear that we all experience the same world, we can turn our
attention to the truly important message that quantum mechanics has for us.
Quantum mechanics does not concern the world that the One manifests to itself
(or herself or himself). It concerns how the One manifests this world to itself—and
therefore to us, inasmuch as we “are all really only various aspects of the One.”
For there to be an experienced world, there must be qualia (sensory qualities),
there must be forms (arrangements of qualia), and there must be objects (re-
identifiable arrangements of qualia). In an experienced world, qualia come first. In
the manifestation of (the mathematically describable aspects of) such a world, on
the other hand, an effective self-multiplication of the One comes first. By entering
into reflexive spatial relations, the One gives rise to (i) what looks like a multitude
of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is ignored, and (ii) what looks like
a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. The relata
are usually referred to as “fundamental particles” and regarded as the “ultimate
constituents of matter”.29 This initial stage of the manifestation of the One to itself
is probed by high-energy physics and known to us through correlations between
27 Such an aperspectival experience features prominently in the work of Jean Gebser[73,74]
and in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo.[75] Here is an account of an experience of this kind:
“It is as if the consciousness was not in the same position with regard to things—I do not
know how to say it. . . . The ordinary human consciousness, even when it has the widest ideas,
is always at the centre, and things are like this (gesture of convergence from all sides). . . . I
believe this is how it is best expressed: in the ordinary human consciousness one is at a point
and all things exist in their relation to this point of consciousness. And now, the point exists
no more. . . . So, my consciousness is in the things—it is not something which is receiving”.[76]
In other words, the subject is where its objects are; it lacks the distantiating viewpoint of our
perspectival outlook.
28 The generic vantage point of the observer in any covariant physical theory should not be
confused with the aperspectival vantage point of our ultimate subject. Nor should the fact
that we experience the world from different vantage points be understood as implying that we
experience a self-existent world. The world exists only in consciousness, but a consciousness
that is capable of perceiving its content both aperspectivally and perspectivally.
29 A fundamental particle is often characterized as pointlike, and many physicists take this
to be the literal truth. What it actually means is that a fundamental particle lacks internal
structure. Lacking internal relations, it also lacks a form. And lacking a form, it cannot be
regarded as contained in space, for if space is the totality of existing spatial relations, it only
contains forms, i.e., sets of spatial relations. There is even a sense in which space is internal to
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detector clicks (i.e., in terms of transition probabilities between in-states and out-
states).
Next (in logical order) come forms. Forms emerge as sets of more or less in-
definite spatial relations between formless and numerically identical relata, i.e.,
between the One and the One. The forms of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms “exist” in
probability spaces of increasing dimensions. At energies low enough for atoms to
be stable, we are dealing with Lockean substances that can be described in terms
of correlations between the possible outcomes of unperformed measurements. (Re-
call note 21.) At a further stage in the manifestation of the One to itself a new
kind of form emerges: a 3-dimensional form that we can visualize, and this not
merely as a distribution over a 3-dimensional probability space. Molecules strad-
dle the boundary between the manifested world and what is instrumental in its
manifestation.30
If the manifestation of the world’s quantitative aspects consists in a progressive
transition from the undifferentiated unity of the One to a multitude of distinguish-
able objects with definite properties, the question arises as to how the intermediate
stages are to be described—the stages at which distinguishability and definiteness
are incompletely realized. The answer is that whatever is not completely distin-
guishable or definite can only be described in terms of probability distributions
over what is completely distinguishable and definite—i.e., over the possible out-
comes of measurements. What is instrumental in the manifestation of the world
can only be described in terms of correlations between events that happen (or
could happen) in the manifested world. This, I believe, is why the general theo-
retical framework of contemporary physics is a probability calculus, and why the
events to which it serves to assign probabilities are measurement outcomes.
16 Beyond quantum mechanics
As was stressed by Bertrand Russell,[77] “[p]hysics is mathematical, not because
we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little: it is
only its mathematical properties that we can discover.” In particular, physics can
tell us nothing about the very qualia which, in any experienced world, come first—
they are the “stuff” that the shapes of perceived objects are made of. Since by the
time physics must abdicate, the manifestation of the world (to its experiencing
subjects) is as yet unfinished, whatever remains to be said on this subject belongs
to the domain of “irrational, mystical hypotheses.” (You have been warned.)
One important subject in this domain concerns the part that biological cells, or-
gans, and particularly brains play in the manifestation of the world. To begin with,
how can we understand the undeniable correlations between measurable brain
function and qualitative experience (e.g. [78])? As Maurice Merleau-Ponty[79] and
Karl Jaspers[80] have pointed out, the existence of correlations between sensory
experiences and neural processes is itself a fact of experience and thus cannot be
each fundamental particle, since each fundamental particle is the One and each spatial relation
is a relation between the One and the One.
30 What makes the atomic configurations of molecules visualizable is that the indefiniteness
of the distance d between any pair of bonded atoms, as measured by the standard deviation of
the corresponding probability distribution, is significantly smaller than the mean value of d.
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what gives rise to experience. For an illustration of this point, imagine a neurosci-
entist, Alice, who observes a specific complex of neural processes in Bob’s visual
cortex whenever she sees that a green apple is located in Bob’s visual field. Some-
thing in her experience of Bob’s brain correlates with something in her experience
of what Bob is looking at. If Bob tells her that he, too, perceives a green apple,
it confirms the existence of a green apple in a shared objective world. What it
does not confirm is the existence of a real apple that causes both Alice and Bob
to perceive an apple, nor the belief that Bob’s brain—as experienced and stud-
ied by Alice—serves as a link in a causal chain that connects a real apple in a
mind-independent world to Bob’s experience of an apple.
When we say “this is a green apple,” we do not state the correspondence of a
perception to a thing-in-itself. While our judgment that this is a green apple goes
beyond what is immediately given to us, it does not reach beyond what is given to
us. It merely involves the claim that this thing is of much the same color, shape,
and consistency as the things we previously judged to be green apples, or the
claim that this particular experience is of the same kind as experiences we previ-
ously referred to as “green apples.” It involves the correspondence between “green
apple experienced here and now” and “green apple experienced there and then.”
Representations are re-presentations of experiential material that was present at
some other time. They are objective in the sense of being recognizable invariants
of experience. Schro¨dinger was again spot on:
to say . . . that the becoming of the world is reflected in a conscious mind is
but a cliche´, a phrase, a metaphor that has become familiar to us. The world
is given but once. Nothing is reflected. The original and the mirror-image
are identical. The world extended in space and time is but our represen-
tation. Experience does not give us the slightest clue of its being anything
besides that.[71]
However, the fact that there is no mind-independent world in itself, nor a mind-
independent apple in itself, does not imply that the experienced apple is all there
is, or that the experienced brain is all there is to the brain. Quantum phenomena
in our common external world inform us of something that takes place behind
or beyond our common external world. They tell the story of a One that, by
entering into reflexive spatial relations, gives rise to Lockean substances such as
quarks, leptons, nucleons, nuclei, and atoms, which play an instrumental role in the
manifestation of the world. Likewise, there may be something behind or beyond
the brain experienced and studied by Alice, by virtue of which it too may play an
instrumental role in the manifestation of the world.
While the world that the One qua ultimate object manifests to itself qua ulti-
mate subject is a world of qualities, the manifestation of the world as illuminated
by quantum physics takes us no further than to the mathematically describable
formal and functional aspects of the world as experienced by us. So whence the
qualities of this world? And let it be noted here that it is not only the sensations
of color, sound, taste, smell, and touch that fail to be reducible to quantities.
Our experiences of space and time are qualitative as well and therefore equally
irreducible to quantities.31
31 Like the color of a Burmese ruby, spatial extension is a quality that can only be defined by
ostentation—by drawing attention to something of which we are directly aware. If you are not
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Patterns of electrochemical pulses in a brain (as experienced and studied by
Alice) yield quantitative parameters that correlate with qualitative aspects of ex-
perience but, being themselves experienced (by neuroscientists like Alice), they
cannot give rise to the qualitative aspects of experience, which include the experi-
ence of the expanse of phenomenal space as well as the experiences of change and
temporal succession. The information that our brain (as experienced and studied
by Alice) extracts from the images falling on our retinas is encoded in signals
that need to be interpreted. The decoding or interpretation of these signals pre-
supposes acquaintance with phenomenal space and phenomenal time, and such
acquaintance is not something that neural processes (as experience and studied
by Alice) can provide. So the question is not only “whence the qualia?” but also
“whence our forms of perception?”
According to the Upanishads, all knowledge is based on identity. At bottom the
self for which the world exists is one with the substance by which the world exists.
When the ultimate subject adopts a multitude of standpoints within the content of
its consciousness, knowledge by identity takes the form of a direct knowledge, and
when the localized subject identifies itself with a particular object (a body), direct
knowledge gets reduced to a direct knowledge of some of this object’s attributes. If
the localized subject nevertheless perceives not these attributes (in our own case,
patterns of electrochemical pulses in our brains) but external objects, it is because
whatever is or appears missing from these attributes (intentionality, qualia, and
our forms of perception) is supplied subliminally, by our ultimate subject’s direct
knowledge of the content of its consciousness. (“Intentionality” refers to the fact
that, instead of perceiving internal representations, we perceive external objects.)
As direct knowledge is supported and made possible by an underlying knowledge
by identity, so representative knowledge is supported and made possible by an
underlying direct knowledge, which belongs to the ultimate subject in us.32 (Fig. 2)
But why should the ultimate subject not only adopt a multitude of standpoints
but also identify itself with each to the seeming exclusion of the others? The answer
hinges on the evolutionary nature of our world. From the point of view of the
Upanishads, evolution presupposes involution. If it is by a multiple concentration
of consciousness that the ultimate subject assumes a multitude of vantage points,
then it is by a multiple exclusive concentration that the individual subjects lose
sight of their identity with each other and, as a consequence, forfeit access to the
convinced, try to explain to my friend Andy, who lives in a spaceless world, what space is like.
Andy is good at math, so he understands you perfectly if you tell him that space is like a set of
all triplets of real numbers. But if you believe that this gives him a sense of the expanse we call
space, you are deluding yourself. We can imagine triplets of real numbers as points embedded
in space; he cannot. We can interpret the difference between two numbers as the distance
between two points; he cannot. At any rate, he cannot associate with the word “distance”
the phenomenal remoteness it conveys to us. The same point was made by Hermann Weyl[81]
when he wrote that geometry “contains no trace of that which makes the space of intuition
what it is in virtue of its own entirely distinctive qualities which are not shared by ‘states of
addition-machines’ and ‘gas-mixtures’ and ‘systems of solutions of linear equations’.”
32 “In the surface consciousness knowledge represents itself as a truth seen from outside,
thrown on us from the object, or as a response to its touch on the sense, a perceptive re-
production of its objective actuality. . . . Since it is unable to . . . observe the process of the
knowledge coming from within, it has no choice but to accept what it does see, the external
object, as the cause of its knowledge. . . . In fact, it is a hidden deeper response to the contact,
a response coming from within that throws up from there an inner knowledge of the object,
the object being itself part of our larger self.” [75, pp. 560–61]
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Fig. 2 Representative knowledge: a flowchart
ultimate subject’s direct knowledge. The direct self-knowledge of the One becomes
implicit, or involved, in an indirect knowledge.
Involution can be carried further. Because the ultimate subject is one with the
ultimate object, the consciousness by which the former creates its content, is one
with the force by which the latter creates its forms. But the creative consciousness
can also become implicit or involved in the formative force, and in doing so give
rise to a world of living but unconscious forms. The formative force can in turn
become implicit or involved in forms, and in doing so give rise to a world of
inanimate forms. And if the involution of the formative force is carried to its
absolute extreme, the result is a world of formless (and, being formless, numerically
identical) individuals. This (or something very much like this) is how the stage for
the adventure of evolution has been set.33
But what can justify this adventure, considering all the pain and suffering
that it entails? Certainly not an extra-cosmic Creator imposing these evils on his
creatures. But the One of the Upanishads is no such monster; it imposes these
things on itself. But still—why? Here goes:34
a play of self-concealing and self-finding is one of the most strenuous joys
that conscious being can give to itself, a play of extreme attractiveness.
There is no greater pleasure for man himself than a victory which is in
its very principle a conquest over difficulties, a victory in knowledge, a
victory in power, a victory in creation over the impossibilities of creation. . . .
There is an attraction in ignorance itself because it provides us with the
joy of discovery, the surprise of new and unforeseen creation. . . . If delight
33 If one wants to manifest a world containing stable, spatially extended objects, and if one
wants to do this using formless and numerically identical individuals, then one needs not only
quantum mechanics but something like general relativity and the standard model.[28,82,83]
34 “Conscious being” is Sri Aurobindo’s term for the ultimate subject that is one with the
ultimate object. “Delight of existence” (a¯nanda) is the third of the three terms in which
ultimate reality is described by the Upanishads, the first two being the substance (sat) that
constitutes the world and the consciousness (chit) that contains the world.
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of existence be the secret of creation, this too is one delight of existence;
it can be regarded as the reason or at least one reason of this apparently
paradoxical and contrary Lila. [75, pp. 426–27]
L¯ıla¯ is a term of Indian philosophy which describes the manifested world as the
field for a joyful sporting game made possible by self-imposed limitations. It is
due to particular limitations imposed by the One on itself that the evolution of
its formative force and the creation of animate forms requires the evolution of
complex anatomies and physiologies, and it is due to the same limitations that the
evolution of a consciousness such as we possess requires the evolution of an organ
as complex as the human brain. But since what has been involved in inanimate
forms and formless particles is an unlimited consciousness and an unlimited force,
evolution is far from finished. What has yet to evolve is a consciousness that is
not exclusively concentrated in individuals, a consciousness aware of the mutual
identity of all individuals, a consciousness no longer confined to the perspectival
outlook of a localized being but capable of integrating its perspectival outlook
with the aperspectival outlook of the ultimate subject.
At present the complexity of the human brain is both part of the manifested
world and instrumental in its manifestation (to us). It is however conceivable
that the evolution of an unlimited consciousness and force can dispense with the
instrumentality of muscles, bones, stomachs, hearts, and lungs; that the complete
embodiment of such a consciousness and force will have no need of such quasi-
mechanical devices; and that the world will be manifest to its inhabitants directly,
without the mediation of brains.
If this sounds preposterous, it is in large part because our theoretical dealings
with the world are conditioned by the manner in which the world is manifested
to us at this particular stage of our evolution. We tend to ignore that the manner
in which humans experience the world has changed and will change again. And if
we think of an evolution of consciousness, we tend to think of it as a successive
emergence of ways of experiencing a world that is essentially independent of how
it is experienced. But such a world does not exist. There are only different ways
in which the One manifests itself to itself.
The different ways in which the One has so far manifested itself to human
consciousness have been painstakingly documented by Jean Gebser.[73] One way
to characterize the succession of consciousness structures that have emerged or
are currently emerging is their increasing dimensionality. An increase in the di-
mensionality of the consciousness to which the world is manifested is tantamount
to an increase in the dimensionality of the manifested world. By way of example,
consider the consciousness structure that immediately preceded the still dominant
one. One of its characteristics was the notion that the world is enclosed in a sphere,
with the fixed stars attached to its boundary, the firmament. We cannot but ask:
what is beyond that sphere? Those who held this notion could not, because for
them the third dimension of space—viewer-centered depth—did not at all have
the reality it has for us. Lacking this dimension, the world experienced by them
was in an important sense two-dimensional. This is why they could not handle
perspective in drawing and painting, and why they were unable to arrive at the
subject-free “view from nowhere”,[84] which is a prerequisite of modern science.
All this became possible with the consolidation, during the Renaissance, of our
perspectival consciousness structure.
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Our very concepts of space, time, and matter are bound up with, are cre-
ations of our present, characteristically three-dimensional consciousness structure.
This made it possible to integrate the location-bound outlook of a characteristi-
cally two-dimensional consciousness into an effectively subject-free world of three-
dimensional objects. Matter as we know it was the result.35 It is not matter that
has created consciousness; it is consciousness that has created matter, first by car-
rying its multiple exclusive concentration to the point of being involved in inani-
mate forms and formless particles, and again by evolving our present mode of expe-
riencing the world. Ahead of us lies the evolution of a consciousness structure—and
thus of a world—that transcends our time- and space-bound perspective. Just as
the mythological thinking of the previous consciousness structure could not foresee
the technological explosion made possible by science, so scientific thinking cannot
foresee the consequences of the birth of a new world, brought about, not by tech-
nological means, but by a further increase in the dimensionality of the evolving
consciousness.
Neither atoms nor molecules, neither cells nor organs like the human brain
are likely to exist in the word that will then be manifest. All of these structures
are instrumental in the process by which the One is manifesting itself to itself
progressively, beginning with subatomic particles and atoms and continuing with
biological organs, which may eventually become dispensable like a scaffolding or
the chrysalis of a butterfly. At bottom, all scientific knowledge concerns structures
that play instrumental roles in the manifestation of a world that is to come. The
reason these structures loom so large in our scientific dealings with the world is
that they are governed by laws. For we can rationally understand only what can
be reduced to laws. What this comes to saying is that as yet we know nothing
about what will eventually be manifest—even though we know beauty when we
see it and appreciate goodness—quality, perfection, excellence, arete¯; we just can’t
comprehend these things in rational terms.
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